When a moment frame experiences brittle connection fracture, the seismic response demands on the remaining frame element increase substantially, increasing the probability of undesirable seismic response. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the seismic performance of IMFs buildings with RBS-B connections designed in accordance with current design code requirements [3] .
INTRODUCTION
The RBS moment connection limits the amount of moment demand transferred to the column face by selectively trimming portions of the beam flanges. This promotes the formation of a plastic hinge at the location where the beam section is reduced thereby protecting the beam-column connection, and increasing the moment frame ductility and energy dissipation capacity.
FEMA350 [1] reported RBS-W connection can develop a total of 0.04 radian with high confidence, sufficiently for the Special Moment Frames to repeatedly achieve a 4% story drift angle during a design-level earthquake without connection fracture. And ANSI/AISC 358-05 [3] allows the RBS-B connection to be used as a prequalified moment connection for IMF systems. Han et al. [6] , however, investigated the cause of fracture in RBS-B connections designed according to FEMA 350 [1] and found that the connection moment strength equation specified in FEMA 350 [1] overestimates the actual moment strength of RBS-B connections, leading to connection brittle failure before the plastic moment capacity is reached at reduced beam sections.
When a moment frame experiences brittle connection fracture, the seismic response demands on the remaining frame element increase substantially, increasing the probability of undesirable seismic response. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the seismic performance of IMFs buildings with RBS-B connections designed in accordance with current design code requirements [3] .
In order to investigate whether IMF systems with RBS-B connections provide satisfactory seismic performance, a seismic performance evaluation based on the procedure specified in FEAM-P695 [2] is conducted in this study. Four 3-, 6-, 9-, and 20-story model buildings with RBS-B connections are designed in accordance with current design code requirements considering different bay widths, and seismic design categories.
II. ANALYTICAL MODEL FOR IMF SYSTEMS WITH RBS-B MOMENT CONNECTIONS

A. Hysteretic Behavior of RBS-B Moment Connections
The moment strength of fracture-resistant RBS-B connections gradually deteriorates due to the local buckling after the peak moment strength is attained as shown in Fig.  1a , whereas the fracture-prone RBS-B connections Fig.1b [6] experiences connection fracture prior to gradual deterioration of moment strength, causing a sharp decrease in moment strength [6] . The fracture-resistant RBS-B connections, the connection moment strength, M n , is larger than the moment demand at the column face, M f-pr corresponding to the probable maximum moment at the center of the reduced beam section. The connections, therefore, behaves in a ductile manner when they experience significant strength degradation beyond M f-pr due to local buckling. In contrast, the moment demand on the fracture-prone RBS-B connections exceeds the connection moment strength capacity, which leads to connection fracture. In order to predict the incidence of connection fracture, we use (1) with (2) as proposed by Han et al. [6] .
B. Analytical Model for RBS-B Moment Connections
An analytical model for RBS-B connections is proposed based on the M2 model which can reflect clear lengths for beams and columns with explicit modeling of the panel zone as shown in Fig.2 .
Columns are modeled using a fiber section model consisting of steel material with a strain hardening ratio of 3% (Fig.2a) . To represent the hysteretic behavior of the panel zone, two spring elements are placed to simulate the trilinear force-deformation relationship as shown in Fig.2b , including the contribution of post-yield stiffness and strength of column flanges after the column web yields. For the beam-column connection, a fracture spring is installed (Fig.2d) to fail when the moment demand at the connection reaches the connection moment strength [6] . The RBS is modeled with an inelastic rotational spring element, placed at the center of the RBS (Fig.2c) to simulate the strength and the stiffness deterioration using a tri-linear backbone curve.
In Fig.2c (1) The probability of collapse for the maximum considered earthquake (MCE) ground motions is recommended to be 10% or less on average across a performance group that contains model frames having a specific seismic force resisting system with different configurations.
(2) For an individual model frame, the probability of collapse is 20%, or less.
A step-by-step procedure to determine the average value ( ACMR ) and individual value (ACMR i ) of the adjusted collapse margin ratio is as follows:  Select the model frames having a specific seismic force resisting system of interest which reflects the range of design variables such as number of stories s, bay lengths, and seismic design categories (SDC), and design the selected frames according to current seismic design provisions. Divide the model frames into performance groups that share a common set of features and behavioral characteristics.  Idealize the model frame using a proper analytical model.  Conduct nonlinear static analysis to determine the overstrength factor, , and period-based ductility,  T (= u /  yeff ) using (3), and (4) with (5), respectively. Conduct the incremental dynamic analysis (IDA) for computing median collapse capacity, and calculate the collapse margin ratio, ˆC T S , for each model frame. Collapse capacity is represented by pseudo spectral acceleration PSA(T n ,5%) at the fundamental period (T n ) of a 5% damped SDF system. The CMR is calculated using (6) , where S MT is the pseudo spectral acceleration at T n of a model frame corresponding to the maximum considered earthquake at a site of interest: The ACMR is the calculated using (9)
Determine whether individual model frames and the performance group satisfy the acceptable performance criteria specified in (1) and (2).
IV. FEAM-P695 SEISMIC COLLAPSE EVALUATION OF THE MODEL BUILDINGS
A. Model Performance Group and Ground Motions
This study adopts the seismic performance evaluation procedure prescribed by FEAM-P695 [2] . Four performance groups comprising frame model with varying number of stories, bay widths, and different seismic design categories (SDC) are considered. The seismic force resisting system for the model frame is the IMF with RBS-B connections. Frames with 3, 6, 9 and 20 stories are considered. The bay widths considered are 6 and 9 m. Two seismic design categories are considered, the lower and upper bounds of Seismic Design Category C (SDC C min and SDC C max ). Note that the SDC C building height is not limited by ASCE/SEI 7 [4] for IMF systems. Table 1 summarizes the 16 different models considered in this study, grouped into four FEAM-P695 performance groups.
The buildings are assumed to be standard office buildings (occupancy category II) located on sites classified as site class D. For IMF systems, the response modification coefficient (R) is 4.5, system overstrength factor ( 0 ) is 3, and deflection amplification factor (C d ) is 4 using specified value in ASCE/SEI 7-10 [4] . The gravity dead and live loads for design are 4.12 kPa and 0.96 kPa, respectively. The IMFs are designed according to ASCE/SEI 7 [4] along with the IMF system design requirements specified in ANSI/AISC-341 and the design procedures for the RBS connection specified in ANSI/AISC 358 [3] . To determine the dimensions for the RBS section, the M f-pr /M n ratio is set to 0.95.
To conduct the incremental dynamic analysis, 44 farfield ground motions, obtained by FEAM-P695 [2] from the PEER NGA database considering earthquake magnitudes ranging from 6.5 to 7.6 and site classes C and D are used.
B. FEAM-P695 Seismic Collapse Evaluation Result
Seismic performance evaluation is conducted for the 16 model frames shown in Table 1 using the procedure prescribed in FEAM-P695 [2] . Table 2 summarizes the evaluation results for each model building. Five of the 16 model frames and one of the four performance groups fail to meet the FEAM-P695 acceptance criteria. Fig. 10 shows the probability of collapse for MCE earthquake with respect variables.
The failed five model frames are 6C max -6, 9C max -6, and 20C max -6 with a bay width of 6 m designed for SDC C max , 20C min -6 with a bay width of 6 m designed for SDC C min and 20C max -9 with a bay width of 9 m designed for SDC C max . The failed performance group is Group 1 that contains model frames with bay length of 6 m designed for SDC C min . Sixteen model frames and four performance groups were with different number of stories, bay lengths and SDC values were considered. Five of 16 model frames and one of four performance groups failed to meet acceptable performance levels against collapse according to FEAM-P695 [2] .
The collapse performance of IMFs with RBS-B connections evaluated using the FEAM-P695 procedure is, in general, not satisfactory. It is recommended that RBS-B connections should not be used in IMFs higher than 6 stories. In particular, it depends on the design parameters such that an increase in story height and a decrease in bay width lead to a higher probability of system collapse.
